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The principal remaining technical impediments to the wide adoption of quantum key distribution 
(QKD) in its present form are: its limitation to metro-area fiber spans of typically less than 100km 
(~ 200km with heroic measures); and its incompatibility with the optical amplifiers (OA) that are 
typically installed with ~ 70-km spacing on longer fiber spans. Trusted QKD networks [1] and quantum 
repeater networks can overcome the metro-area range limit, but are not compatible with OAs and so 
cannot be deployed as overlays on existing fiber infrastructure. Further, the dedicated network resources, 
requirements for multiple intermediate nodes, and duplication of quantum resources make these 
architectures cumbersome, expensive and hence of limited practical potential. We present a new protocol 
called amplified quantum key distribution (AQKD) [2] that is compatible with OAs, and describe a 
simulation of a particular AQKD configuration that would provide as much as twice the single-span range 
of standard weak-laser BB84 QKD. With AQKD, inter-city distances such as Boston-New York will 
become possible without the practical drawbacks of the trusted relay and quantum repeater approaches. 
QKD over amplified spans is considered infeasible because the amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) 
[3] noise added by an OA would push the sifted bit error rate (BER) above the upper limit of the standard 
BB84 protocol. However, for a classical broadcast channel Maurer [4] has shown that Alice and Bob can 
use a protocol called advantage distillation (AD) to achieve a non-zero secret key capacity, even if Bob’s 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is initially worse than Eve’s. A first condition for using AD is that Alice and 
Bob know a rigorous lower bound on Eve’s SNR, which is problematic for classical communications. But 
for quantum communications, if Alice’s transmitter includes an OA it will introduce unavoidable noise of 
quantum origin (due to ASE) that will rigorously enforce such a bound on Eve’s SNR by the laws of 
quantum physics. A second condition for using AD is that Bob’s and Eve’s errors are uncorrelated, which 
will hold if Eve is restricted to passive tapping of the Alice-Bob quantum channel. For this case, the 
recently-established loose upper bound on secret key capacity (referred to here as the “Takeoka bound”) 
[5] is more than an order-of-
magnitude higher than the capacity of 
weak-laser BB84 QKD for typical 
channel parameters. Together, these 
observations suggest that major 
performance gains are achievable 
under this security model using our 
new AQKD protocol (Fig. 1), in 
which the Alice-Bob quantum channel 
contains one or more OAs, and the 
protocol post-processing stage 
includes AD after sifting, but before 
error correction (EC) and privacy 
amplification (PA) against tapping. 
We demonstrate these gains with a simulation of the polarization-coded AQKD instantiation of Fig. 2, 
in which Alice’s qubit states (Poisson-distributed photon number with mean  ~ 1 at ~ 1,550-nm 
wavelength), produced by our integrated photonics BB84 “QKarD” light source [6], are amplified by a 
phase-insensitive OA. Alice’s OA, with gain G, produces ASE in each polarization mode with mean-
photon number <nsp> = (G – 1) per longitudinal mode [7], where ≥ 1 is the excess noise factor. In the 
following we assume  = 1, the well-known “3-dB limit” of unavoidable, minimum noise of quantum 
origin of a phase-insensitive amplifier. After passing through an L-km span of single-mode fiber (SMF) 
these signals are detected by Bob’s passive-basis choice BB84 receiver. We assume polarization errors of 
Figure 1. Amplified quantum key distribution (AQKD) protocol 
between Alice (A) and Bob (B). See text for details. 
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1%, and single-photon detector (SPD) characteristics (detection efficiency, d, and dark noise probability 
per gate, pd) that are representative of ns-gated indium-gallium arsenide (InGaAs) avalanche photodiodes 
(APD) operated in Geiger 
mode. Alice’s and Bob’s 
enclaves also include matched 
optical filters, whose 
bandwidth can be selected to 
achieve single longitudinal 
mode operation. (Filters of ~ 1-
GHz, 3-dB bandwidth, which 
would be required for 1-ns 
detector gates, are 
commercially available). With 
30dB out-of-band rejection, 
these filters also suppress out-
of-band ASE and fiber-
generated Raman-noise [8] to 
negligible levels. A suitable polarization tracking and compensation system to correct fiber birefringence 
has been demonstrated [6], but is not shown in Fig. 2. 
Alice’s amplified BB84 signals contain a Laguerre-Gauss distributed photon number of mean 
nLG = G + <nsp> in the same polarization, and a Bose-Einstein distributed photon number with mean 
nBE = <nsp> in the orthogonal polarization, resulting in quantum signals of mean photon number 
n = (nLG + nBE) and polarization fidelity F = nLG/n. For G > 1 Bob’s sifted key therefore has more bits and 
a higher BER than in standard BB84 (G = 1) at the same  value. In the passive tapping scenario we 
assume that Eve receives every photon that Bob does not detect, and uses a passive-basis choice BB84 
receiver with ideal (100% efficient, zero noise) photon-number resolving detectors. By monitoring 
Alice’s and Bob’s sifting messages, Eve learns the sifting basis for each bit. Within that basis, she assigns 
an unambiguous sifted bit value to whichever of her two detectors records the larger photo-count, and a 
random bit value for the ambiguous case when the two detectors record equal photo-counts. Neither Eve’s 
unambiguous bit errors nor her ambiguous bits are correlated with Bob’s sifted bit errors. In the next, 
distillation, phase of the AQKD protocol we both generalize Maurer’s AD to accommodate both 
unambiguous and ambiguous portions of Eve’s sifted key, and simplify its implementation.  
To form their distilled keys Alice, Bob (and Eve) parse their N-bit sifted keys {xj , j = 0, 1, … N – 1}, 
where xj = aj for Alice (A), xj = bj for Bob (B), and xj = ej for Eve (E) respectively, into N/2 bit-pairs 
[x2i+1, x2i], i = 0, 1, … (N/2 – 1). (We assume N is even without loss of generality.) Next, Alice, Bob and 
Eve each form two, N/2-bit subsequences: F = {fi = x2i   , i = 0, 1, … (N/2 – 1)}, and P = {pi = x2i+1  x2i , 
i = 0, 1, … (N/2 – 1)}. Alice transmits her parity sequence, PA = {a2i+1  a2i   , i = 0, 1, … (N/2 – 1)}, to 
Bob. He compares the value pA,i of each element of the sequence PA received from Alice, with the 
corresponding element pB,i of his sequence PB. From his bit sequence FB he forms his distilled key, DB, of 
bits fB,i for which pB,i = pA,i , i.e. DB = {fB,i  |  pB,i = pA,i , i = 0, 1, … (N/2 – 1)}, and discards the rejected 
bits of FB (i.e. bits fb,i for which pB,i ≠ pA,i) as well as the entire parity sequence PB. Bob calculates the 
rejection index sequence, R = { i  | pB,i ≠ pA,i  , i = 0, 1, … (N/2 – 1)}, and sends it to Alice. With this 
information, Alice discards the rejected bits from her sequence FA, as well as her entire sequence PA, to 
form her distilled key, DA. To form her distilled key, DE, Eve can assign an unambiguous bit value to each 
distilled bit arising from a pair of unambiguous sifted bits, but must assign a random (ambiguous) value 
to all other distilled bits. This generalized advantage distillation (GAD) protocol results in distilled keys 
on which Bob’s BER is lower than on his sifted key, while Eve’s ambiguous fraction is increased and the 
BER on her unambiguous portion is unchanged. Alice and Bob now form their secret keys by applying 
EC and PA against passive tapping to their distilled keys. Although the reduction in key size for GAD 
Figure 2. A representative AQKD configuration in which Alice’s BB84 
signals are optically amplified before transmission to Bob. See text for details.
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somewhat offsets the increase from optical gain, Eve’s reduced information per bit (owing to ASE and 
distillation) results in more secret key bits for Alice and Bob than in standard BB84 at the same . 
This is apparent in Fig. 3, 
where the lowest, purple curve 
shows the secret bit yield of 
standard BB84 at the optimal 
mean photon number of  = 1.5 
under the passive tapping 
security model. Up to 100-km 
span lengths, standard BB84 is 
an order of magnitude below the 
Takeoka bound (upper-most, 
light-blue curve). Taking a 
practical lower bound of 10-6 on 
secret bit yield as defining the 
maximum range, we find that 
standard BB84 cannot go 
beyond 145km in SMF, whereas 
the Takeoka bound is ~ 275km. 
For the green curve, we have 
introduced a stage of GAD after sifting and before EC into standard BB84, without optical gain (G = 1). 
We see that this gives no improvement over standard BB84 for spans up to 100km, but does increase the 
maximum range by 40km. This illustrates how GAD is particularly effective in low SNR regimes. With 
the red curve, we introduce a gain of G = 4/3 (corresponding to optimal 1→2 quantum cloning), and find 
optimal AQKD performance for a mean photon number input to Alice’s OA of  = 2.5. Even at this low 
gain AQKD gives some improvement in secret bit yield over standard BB84 for spans up to 100km 
(~10% increase), while increasing the maximum range by 50% to 210km. The dark blue curve is for a 
larger gain of G = 16, with a mean photon number input to Alice’s OA of  = 1.7. For this configuration, 
AQKD gives: ~ 3 times the secret bit yield of standard BB84 at span lengths up to 100km; more than an 
order of magnitude improvement at 140km; and adds more than 100km to the maximum range of 
standard BB84 (to 250km), while coming within a factor of 4 of the Takeoka bound. The maximum range 
for this configuration could be further pushed out to ~ 300km if Bob uses high-efficiency, low-noise 
superconducting detectors, and ultra-low loss SMF is used for the Alice-Bob fiber. We expect that 
performance gains (range and secret rate) will also result from adding one or more intermediate OAs 
between Alice and Bob to the single-OA configuration of Fig. 1. An experimental implementation of 
Fig.1 to evaluate AQKD performance with practical OAs is now in preparation for our QKD network test 
bed [6] at Los Alamos. We are investigating the extension of the AD and PA stages of the AQKD 
protocol for security against active attacks (intercept-resend, photon-number splitting etc.): such attacks 
will give Eve less information than in standard BB84, owing to the ASE noise. 
Our AQKD protocol will extend the range of quantum cryptography from metro-area to at least inter-
city distances, and we expect that it can be deployed as an overlay on fiber spans carrying conventional 
optical traffic [6, 8] that contain intermediate OAs. It will enable the wide application of QKD. 
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Figure 3. Simulation results for the secret bit yield (secret bits per transmitted 
bit) as a function of fiber span length for the system of Fig. 1 under the 
passive tapping security model. See text for details. 
